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Fetal Tissue Transplantation: 
An Ethical Analysis 
Mark A. Ressler, S.T.L 
This paper was writtenfor a seminar directed by William E. May, Ph. D., 
at the Catholic University of America. 
Introduction 
Fetal tissue research has been going on for decades in the United States. 
In the early years of research tissue was used in developing particular cell 
lines and for safety testing of vaccines. In the last fifteen years, after 
numerous animal studies, medical technology has made it possible to use 
fetal tissue for transplantation in humans.) Such transplantation research is 
now being done in three areas. Human fetal liver tissue and thymus tissue 
are being transplanted into patients in the attempt to treat inherited and 
acquired diseases of the blood and of the immune system, as well as 
inherited diseases of metabolism. For example, transplants have been 
performed on patients with DiGeorge's syndrome, severe combined 
immune deficiency (SCID), leukemia, aplastic anemia, inherited metabolic 
disorders, as well as persons injured by radiation. Transplantation for 
DiGeorge's syndrome is not the treatment of choice for that particular 
disease. Transplantation, however, for other diseases is still on the 
experimental level.2 Fetal pancreatic tissue is now being used for the 
treatment of type I diabetes. Early results of such experimental 
transplantation indicate no adverse reactions and good cell-survival rates, 
with insulin requirements reduced in some cases.) Animal studies have 
indicated that transplanting fetal neural tissue from the brain, spinal cord 
and peripheral nervous system may offer significant therapeutic benefit for 
a variety of neurologic disorders and trauma. For example, there has been 
success in treating patients with Parkinson's disease, a common 
degenerative neurologic illness. 4 There is debate within the scientific and 
medical communities over the therapeutic benefit of fetal tissue 
transplantation into humans. The experiments carried out so far look 
promising but they are still at a very early stage. 
The common source of fetal tissue for research and therapy purposes is 
from inducer of spontaneous abortions. Fetal tissue is preferred to adult 
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tissue because it is believed to:5 
- Be less likely to trigger an immunological response 
- be easier to culture, proliferate, and transplant 
- grow more rapidly and to be more adapatble 
- possess greater potential for restoring damaged tissue and biochemical function 
- be more resistant to lack of oxygen 
- be exceptionally adaptable to a new environment 
- be able to stimulate the growth of new blood vessels 
By far the greatest percentage of fetal tissue comes from induced 
abortions because they provide the fresh and healthy tissue required by 
transplantation research. Tissue from spontaneous abortions is less 
preferred because spontaneous abortions cannot be planned like induced 
abortions and so cannot be depended upon to yield the tissue when it is 
needed. Also, spontaneous abortions are often due to some type of fetal 
abnormality, an abnormality that must not be passed on to a patient 
receiving the transplanted tissue. 
The use of tissue from induced aborted fetuses has brought a ban on the 
use of federal funds to support research. Research using private funds , 
however, is continuing. This ban came about as a result of a proposal by a 
National Institute of Health (NIH) researcher in 1988 to transplant tissue 
from electively aborted fetuses into patients with Parkinson's disease. The 
research proposal was approved by an institutional review board at NIH, 
but approval was withheld by Dr. James Wyngaarden, the Director of the 
NIH , until he received the opinion of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) as to the propriety offunding research in this area. 
In March, 1988, the Assistant Secretary for HHS, Dr. Robert Windom, in a 
letter to the Director of NIH, placed a moratorium on the funding of fetal 
tissue transplantation research until an NIH appointed advisory committee 
could answer ten questions posed by him. The committee answered the 
questions and in December, 1988 a majority of its members approved the 
use of fetal tissue from induced aborted fetuses for human transplantation 
purposes. 6 Dr. Louis Sullivan, the Secretary of HHS, responded to the 
committee's report in a letter written on November 2, 1989 to Dr. William 
Raub, Acting Director of NIH. In this letter the Secretary indicated his 
desire to continue the moratorium on federal funding of research in which 
human fetal tissue from induced abortions is transplanted into human 
recipients. One of the reasons Sullivan gave for his decision was his belief 
that permitting human fetal research will increase the incidence of abortion 
across the country. 7 
This paper will not seek to resolve the debate in the scientific / medical 
community over the therapeutic benefit of fetal tissue transplantation in 
humans. Nor will this paper seek to address the public policy issue 
surrounding this issue. Rather this paper is concerned about several ethical 
issues raised by the use of fetal tissue from induced abortions. The paper 
will first analyze the three competing ethical models for the use of human 
fetal tissue. The paper will then analyze the issues of complicity, 
80 Linacre Quarterly 
inducement, and consent as they relate to this issue. This paper will 
conclude with an evaluation of the ethical issues from the perspective of the 
Vatican document Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and 
the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day. 
The Ethical Models 
Three distinct models are employed to determine the ethics of the 
transplantation of fetal tissue obtained from induced abortions. Each 
assign the fetus a different moral and legal status: the fetus as a body part of 
the mother, the fetus as a cadaver and the fetus as a human research 
sUbject. 8 The first model views the fetus as a body part of the mother and 
treats it like any other part removed at surgery. Such body parts are 
routinely employed in medical diagnostic and research activities. The 
necessity of informed consent from the mother for the use of the fetal tissue 
is the only ethical concern raised by this model. 9 This model permits consent 
to be given prior to the abortion and seeks only the women's consent to use 
the tissue. The father would have no right to veto the use of the tissue since it 
is seen as part of the mother's body. 10 This first model differs from the other 
two which acknowledge that the fetus is a unique individual whose genetic 
constitution is unequivocally different from the mother. This model, in 
other words, does not acknowledge that there are two organisms involved. I I 
The second model treats the dead fetus as a cadaver. It recognizes the 
humanity and individuality of the fetus and so considers the aborted fetus to 
be analogous to any other dead person who has not expressed an opinion 
regarding donation of his or her body .12 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(UAGA), which gives legal guidelines for organ donation in the United 
States, allows another party to give consent for the donation. It even allows 
the donation of fetal tissue and organs by the parents based on their own 
needs, concerns and interests since the wishes of the deceased fetus are 
unknown. The U AGA permits either parent to have veto power over the use 
of the tissue. 13 
The analogy used by the second model (i.e., the dead fetus is like an adult 
cadaver) may be weak for several reasons.14 First, in adult cases the best 
interests · and wishes of the potential donor are being considered. It is 
difficult to believe that a mother or others who had the fetus aborted are 
concerned about the fetus's best interests. Second, organ formation in the 
case of unavoidable death may be a means of obtaining some good from a 
tragic situation. It is entirely different if the death of the donor is arranged 
ahead oftime as occurs frequently in fetal tissue procurement. Third, in the 
case of induced abortion, consent for fetal tissue research is often obtained 
while the fetus is alive to insure fresh, healthy tissue. Since the fetus at this 
point is definitely not a cadaver, it is difficult to see how the cadaver donor 
analogy applies. 
The third model treats the fetus as a human research subject. It recognizes 
the humanity and individuality of the fetus as well as the ethical constraints 
imposed by them. IS However, is it appropriate to treat a dead fetus as if it 
were alive? 
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The first ethical model is generally not concerned about the ethical issues 
discussed below. The only ethical issue that may concern it is consent, that 
is, the need to obtain the woman's consent for the use of "her" tissue. These 
issues however, are a concern for the other two models because they 
recognize the fetus as a unique individual possessing dignity and certain 
rights. 
Complicity 
The use of tissue from induced aborted fetuses has raised the question of 
complicity, that is, does the researcher who uses such tissue orwho permits 
such use, become party, after the fact, to the destruction of the unborn?16 
Both sides of the issue will be given below. 
Complicity 
One can discern four types of moral complicity in evil: active 
collaboration in the deed; indirect association that implies approval; failure 
to prevent the evil when possible; shielding the perpetrator from penalty. 17 
The second type best describes the type of involvement the researcher has 
with the abortionist. The researcher involved in this type of complicity is not 
actually joining in the work itself but somehow enters into a supportive 
alliance. The researcher becomes an associate by resorting to the abortionist 
as a ready supplier of tissue from unborn humans who have been 
intentionally destroyed. By benefitting in the abortionist's injurious 
behavior, the researcher places him or herself in silent but unmistakable 
alliance with what the abortionist is doing. IS 
This second type of complicity is analogous to that condemned by the 
Nuremburg Code of 1946. The German physicians found guilty at the 
N uremburg trials argued that they were only using the brains obtained from 
executed Jews for the good of all humankind. They contended the guilt lay 
with the SS who did the executions and not with them. These physicians 
stated they had an "ethical imperative" to make use of what was provided 
them from the concentration camps. The Nuremburgjudges rejected these 
arguments. 19 The physicians also argued that the imprisonment, torment, 
and killing of the Jews would have happened with or without their 
participation. The physicians here failed to understand that their 
professional presence and the use of the corpses of executed Jews in their 
research offered endorsement and legitimacy to the exterminators and 
established them as accomplices in the exterminations. The Nuremburg 
trials make the point that one need not cause a wrongful act to be party to it; 
it is enough to have abetted it.20 Nuremberg teaches that when the bodies of 
people are forcibly delivered up to be used as some others want, then no 
antecedent good and no subsequent good will absolve those who have been 
confederates in their oppression.21 The complicity between Nazi 
exterminators and physicians was recognized in 1988 when the chief of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EP A) barred the use of data from Nazi 
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experiments on concentration camp prisoners in an EPA report on the 
human effects of a toxic gas. The chief was influenced by a letter from 
twenty-two EPA employees who questioneclthe:use of unethically obtained 
data and expressed doubt about the scientific value of such information.22 
Governments and not just researchers or physicians can be guilty of 
complicity. Consider, for example, the following analogy of a banker who 
judges narcotics to be a tragedy, but agrees to launder the proceeds from the 
local drug network to make more capital available to his clientele. Who 
should believe his readiness to accept those funds is not an act of association 
- indeed, of partnership, in the human tragedies that such monies have 
already purchased? The banker has become a party to destruction even 
though it was complete before his involvement. The point ofthis analogy is 
that it is indeed possible to become a complicit party to abuse, after the fact, 
by enacting an agreement with those who exploit, to take further advantage 
of their victims. The systematic use of electively aborted human remains in 
Federally funded research would make the U.S. government a complicit · 
party, after the fact, to those abortions just as surely as the German research 
made the researchers accomplices, after the fact, of the military personnel 
who had executed the research subjects. 23 Since the implication of 
endorsement is a necessary concomitant of funding, funding must be 
eschewed in order to avoid the complicity inherent in the funding 
relationship.24 It is difficult to see how the use of fetal tissue from induced 
abortions can be institutionalized without threatening a morally 
unacceptable collaboration with the abortion industry.25 Even if a person 
could insure that there was no one-to-one correspondence between an 
individual case of abortion and the subsequent use of the fetal tissue, our 
society bears the ultimate responsibility for both by condoning such 
activity.26 
No Complicity 
A number of arguments is given to refute the charge of complicity. First, 
the researcher does not seem to be cooperating either formally or 
materially.27 If the will or intent is absent, researchers are not necessarily 
implicated in a system about which they may feel moral opprobrium if the 
medical benefits promised are proportionate to the use of fetuses from 
elective abortion.28 Even though the researcers involved in transplantation 
may feel remorse or regret, they are not objectively guilty of cooperation in 
a system about which they may have moral questions, since they are not 
assisting in abortions themselves. Those who argue for complicity fail to 
recognize the important distinction between the foreseen and the intended 
aspects of a human act. 29 If direct benefit from a wrong grounds complicity, 
then the fire fighter (and all his / her dependents, heirs, creditors, etc.) is 
complicit with the arsonist; and the transplant surgeon and recipient are 
complicit with unsafe driving that provides brain dead bodies for organ 
transplants. 3o The researchers are able to disassociate themselves from 
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induced abortions as long as conception and abortion are not premeditated 
means of procuring fetal tissue.3l 
Second, the analogy to Nazi experimentations is weak. These 
experimentations are reprehensible not first and foremost because they 
represent acts of cooperation, but because they lacked authority insofar as 
they lacked informed consent. 32 Also, one could use the results of such 
experiments without approving the horrendous acts of Nazi doctors that 
made such knowledge possible. People may reasonably view such use as 
retrospectively honoring the victims rather than approving their 
victimization.33 
There are as well major differences between the Nazi experimentations 
and fetal tissue transplantation research; the former were not medical 
research projects intended to help the victims of Parkinson's and other 
diseases. Nor were they scrutinized by peer reviews, examined by NIH 
panels, publicized by the media, open to public questioning, debated in 
Congress, and challenged by the administration.34 
Also, unlike the Nazi experimentations, the fetal tissue transplantation 
research does not harm fetuses. They are not aborted to advance research 
and are dead when the research occurs.3S 
Third, it is unclear how complicity can be involved since the researcher 
and patient will ordinarily be removed from the abortion process; they will 
not have requested it; and will have no knowledge of who performed it or 
where it occurred. The abortion will have occurred for reasons unrelated to 
tissue procurement, and the tissue will be procured by a third party.36 Real 
or apparent conflicts of interest can be avoided if the distinction found in 
the analogous situation of organ retrieval from living or cadaver donors is 
maintained between the physician who performs an abortion for a pregnant 
woman and the physician who transplants fetal tissue into the body of 
another patient.J7 Once dead the fetus clearly lacks interests and can no 
more be exploited or harmed than can any cadaver. 38 
Fourth, if infant or adult murder victims may be used for research, 
therapy, or education, there is no apparent reason why fetal victims should 
not be used as well since the patient and physician benefitting from the 
murder do not applaud it or enter into a supportive alliance with the 
murder. In other words, physicians may benefit from or make use of 
induced abortions without also approving of the abortionist's causative act. 
Even later approval or applause of the abortions would not make the 
physician an accomplice in an abortion that has already occurred. 
Physicians or patients are not accomplices in the prior evil merely by 
seeking to achieve some good from a contingent event over which they had 
no control.39 (Those who argue for complicity make the point here that if 
the physician contracted with the murderer to provide him organs for 
transplantation, told him when and where the organs would be made 
available, arranged for the physician or his agents to be present to harvest 
the organs and reimbursed the murderer for any expenses incurred in 
making the organs available - these physicians would be guilty of com-
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plicity. These types of arrangements are routinely made to obtain fetal 
tissue.40) 
Fifth, induced abortions will occur regardless of the needs of researchers. 
This indicates that the abortion and subsequent use are clearly independent 
from each other.41 
Sixth, while there is no intrinsic connection between research on fetal 
tissue and induced abortions, those involved in this form of research have 
an ethical responsibility to make sure that the distance between the two 
realities is kept clear. Several steps should be taken to ensure that 
researchers are not promoting induced abortions: a.) No monies should be 
paid for fetal tissue. If money can be made by becoming pregnant, then 
some type of commerce will probably be developed. (No fees should be paid 
to the woman to abort or to donate tissue. And no fees beyond actual 
expenses should be paid to abortion clinics to provide the tissue.) There are 
federal laws against the sale of organs for transplantation. It seems there 
should be federal laws prohibiting the sale offetal tissue for research as well. 
b.) The possibility of deriving fetal tissue from fetal tissue culture processes 
whose source is fetal tissue from spontaneous abortions should continue to 
be researched. The ethical issue concerning the source of supply of fetal 
tissue might be solved in this way. c.) Fetuses should not be kept alive to 
obtain tissue. d.) Induced abortions should not be performed solely or 
primarily to get tissue for transplantation. e.) Consent for the use of the fetal 
tissue shoiJld be obtained from the woman only after she has decided to 
have an abortion. There should be no discussion in abortion counseling 
about using tissue from the aborted fetus for possible therapeutic 
purposes.42 These five steps are seen by many as sufficient to separate the 
researcher from induced abortions as such. 
Inducement for Abortion 
As we saw above, Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis 
Sullivan continued the moratorium on federal funding of research in which 
human fetal tissue from induced abortions is transplanted into human 
recipients because he believed, among other reasons, that permitting 
hllman fetal tissue research will increase the incidence of abortion across the 
country.43 
Inducement 
The argument for inducement is made in several ways. First, the routine 
beneficial use of human fetal tissue will legitimate abortions previously 
considered immoral such that more immoral abortions may be expected to 
occur.44 Such beneficial use could be a powerful inducement for women to 
have an abortion, that is, they could more easily justify their action by 
having something "good" come from it. Abortion decisions are often very 
difficult . for women, so the appeal to beneficence might be highly 
manipulative of women. The prospect of fetal tissue transplantation offers 
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powerful argument in the hands of abortion clinic counselors who could 
counsel that having an abortion can be good for humanity. Such an 
argument may be a powerful additional reason to go through with the 
abortion.4s Even in the absence of direct interpersonal pressure, the 
beneficence of giving up a fetus for the sake of a disease victim will be widely 
discussed in society and hence likewise influence the woman.46 
Second, fetal tissue transplantation can also be reasonably expected to 
increase abortions due to financial incentives motivating abortion clinics. If 
fetal tissue transplants are successful the supply would not begin to meet the 
demand.47 
Third, if the medical research establishment becomes dependent on 
elective aborted fetuses, an irreversible institutional and economic bond 
between abortion centers and biomedical science will have been established. 
Medical science could have a great deal at stake in the continual flow of 
elective aborted fetuses. With the advent of widespread fetal tissue 
transplantation, induced abortions would no longer be a political issue that 
biomedical researchers could ignore. Rather, livelihoods and institutional 
grants would demand that induced abortions be continued. If this happens 
there might be no turning back because ofthe symbiotic relationship which 
would arise between medical and scientific progress.48 
No Inducement 
The inducement arguments are countered in various ways. It is argued 
that the ultimate impact of fetal tissue transplantation on the incidence of 
induced abortions is simply unknown, and so research should be allowed to 
continue for awhile to determine if abortions do increase. The risk of some 
increase, however, should not justify a total ban.49 Also, there is a sufficient 
amount of fetal tissue available today from induced abortions for 
transplantation so no increase in abortions are likely to resulPo 
Various safeguards can be implemented to prevent or minimize 
inducement. First, to avoid any conflict of interest that might affect their 
advice to patients about abortion, medical personnel who perform induced 
abortions should not be allowed any direct benefit from the subsequent use 
of the fetal tissue. Second, women who undergo induced abortions should 
not be allowed to benefit directly from the subsequent medical use of the 
fetal tissue, through payment for it, through the reimbursement of expenses 
connected with the abortion, by designating who will receive the tissue, or in 
any other manner. Third, the National Organ Transplantation Act should 
be amended to cover human fetal tissue, whether used for transplantation 
or any other medical purpose; and to exclude abortion-related expenses 
from its definition of permissible reimbursements.sl Fourth, permission to 
use tissue from the aborted fetus should be obtained only after the woman 
has made the decision to have the abortion. Fifth, the physicians 
performing the abortion and those performing the transplant should be 
distinct. 
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Consent 
The necessity of obtaining consent to donate fetal tissue is closely related 
to the three ethical models discussed above. If the fetus is viewed as just a 
part of the mother, then no more consent is needed for such a donation than 
for the donation of any tissue specimen of the woman. However, this 
practice is inconsistent with the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) 
which treats the dead fetus as a cadaver donor of tissue (the second ethical 
model). The third model, which treats the fetus as a human research subject 
maintains that the federal regulations for the protection of human subjects 
should apply to this type of research. 52 
If the first ethical model is accepted then there is little controversy 
surrounding consent. The consent of the woman having the abortion is 
sufficient. If the second ethical model is accepted then the differences from 
normal organ donations from cadavers need to be noted. For example, 
when a family surrenders through proxy consent organs from a cadaver for 
transplant they have not been involved in causing the death ofthe person in 
question. 53 Also, the criteria currently in use for defining death for the 
purpose of cadaveric organ donation from postnatal organ donors are not 
sufficient when applied to the fetus. This insufficiency is apparent in the 
unique physiological status of the fetus as compared with postnatal organ 
donors, as well as the fact that the medical personnel who would normally 
be called upon to make the diagnosis of death are either the agents of death 
(the abortion practitioners) or have a vested interest in the subsequent use of 
the tissue (the transplant personnel). New criteria need to be established for 
defining fetal death which would be compatible with obtaining tissue 
suitable for transplantation. However, such criteria are suspect when the 
necessity for developing them is driven by the desire to obtain viable fetal 
tissue. 54 
The third ethical model, which treats the fetus as a human research 
subject, maintains that informed consent cannot be obtained for an 
experimental procedure that calls for the willful killing of the research 
subject.55 It is a canon of ethical science since Nuremberg that no human 
being may be used for research without his or her voluntary consent. If a 
subject is unable to consent to research that might serve his or her own 
welfare, another person can give proxy consent: a parent for a minor child, 
a guardian for a mentally handicapped person, etc. In the case of the use of 
fetal tissue, a mother's power to act on her child's behalf is grounded entirely 
upon her protective office and duty to provide for the child's benefit. 56 But 
the mother's decision to abort her child is an act of such violent 
abandonment of her protection and duty that no further exercise of such 
responsibility is admissible.57 
Since this third model treats the fetus as a human research subject it is 
also concerned that the remains of an aborted fetus be treated with the 
dignity given a human body and not be treated as an impersonal object to be 
owned and used at wil1. 58 Human remains demand dignity because of the 
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dignity owed to the person when he or she was alive. To aisregard that 
dignity after death discredits the dignity to be accorded the person while 
living and orients persons to treat others with contempt. 59 
A~ainst this understanding of dignity it is argued that the key question 
about the dignified treatment of human remain'S is what is done with them. 
If what is done is dignified then the remains are treated with dignity.60 In 
fact, greater dignity seems to be afforded fetal remains ifthey are used as a 
source of transplanted material rather than treated as organic trash. Also, 
the disposers of cadaveric remains are not the guardians or proxies of the 
deceased, who no longer has interests to be guarded. Rather, their role is to 
guard their own feelings and interests in assuring that the remains of kin are 
treated respectfully.61 The absence of a positive warrant (i.e., proper 
consent from the mother or father or State, etc.) should be no bar to use of 
the tissue.62 
On the other hand, the U AGA teaches that human cadavers, organs and 
tissues must be treated as human subjects - not objects - of research, 
protected from arbitrary intrusion or seizure by the essential requirement of 
voluntary consent by the person (or that person's protector). It has been a 
longstanding moral conviction that a human body cannot be owned - it 
can only be held in trusth. Therefore, fetal remains no more belong to the 
next-of-kin than an estate belongs to an executor. And when the only 
reason there is a fetal cadaver to be disposed of is that it was violently 
destroyed at the choice of his or her next-of-kin, that survivor surely forfeits 
his or her right after death, just as he or she violated his or her duty before 
death, to provide the services of posthumous kinship. The unborn is not 
there to serve the interests of those who have him or her in their power.63 
In summary, it can be argued that no one is capable of giving authentic 
consent in the case of tissue donation from an induced abortion since there 
is no honest attempt to serve the best interest ofthe unborn.64 The mother is 
unable to give consent because when she resolves to destroy her unborn 
fetus she has abdicated her office and duty as the guardian of her off-
spring.65 There is no ground for claiming that the medical professionals who 
performed the abortion have rights over remains of aborted fetuses . This is 
especially true since death has resulted from nontherapeutic intervention 
with no consent by the victim.66 The prerogative of the father to release the 
remains of his aborted fetus for medical research is rarely considered, yet in 
comparable instances of significant parental guardianship neither parent is 
considered to act rightfully when he or she avoids consultation or consensus 
with the other parent. The absence of their consent, unless the right to give it 
could credibly be assumed to have been waived, would further encumber 
any others' claim to dispose of the remains. 67 When the natural protectors 
of the weak have either deserted or abused or absented themselves from 
their wards, guardianship usually devolves upon the State as parens patriae. 
But if the State agrees to consign to research the remains of those fetuses 
killed by induced abortions, that inevitably places the State in a position of 
patronage toward their destruction. The State would, like the aborting 
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mother, also be implicitly derelict in its protective powers.68 
Conclusion 
This paper will conclude with an evaluation of the moral issues presented 
above from the perspective of the Vatican document, Instruction on Respect 
for Human Life in Its Origin and the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to 
Certain Questions of the Day (Instruction}.69 The Instruction asserts that a 
human being must be respected and treated as a person from the very first 
instant of his or her existence. 70 Therefore from that same instant his or her 
rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first place is the 
inviolable right of every innocent human being to life. 71 This understanding 
of the human personhood from the moment of conception is obviously 
incompatible with the understanding of the first ethical model which defines 
the fetus as no more than a body part of the mother. The Instruction rejects 
any research based upon such an understanding of the fetus. 
The Instruction permits medical research on live embryos as long as it 
does not involve risk to the embryo's physical integrity or life by reason of 
the methods used or the effects induced.72 Fetal tissue research which uses 
tissue from live fetuses is ruled out by the Instruction because of the risk it 
imposes on the fetus. 73 Also, the Instruction does not allow parental 
consent for tissue transplantation to be given pre mortem since such 
consent is given for research which has no benefit for the fetus. 74 
The Instruction does allow for experimental research or medical use of 
human embryo and fetal remains.75 They are to be treated with the same 
respect as other human remains, and so, can be used only under certain 
conditions. These conditions are: death must be verified; parental consent 
must be obtained; there must be no complicity in deliberate abortion, the 
risk of scandal must be avoided; and there must be no commercial 
trafficking in dead fetuses. 76 
These conditions can be fulfilled ifthe fetal tissue used in transplantation 
comes from spontaneous abortions or ectopic pregnancies. But they seem 
impossible to fulfill if the tissue comes from induced abortions. The 
arguments given above demonstrate the problems of parental consent 
-how can parents presume to act in the best interest of their baby if they 
have chosen to abort him or her? The arguments above also demonstrate 
that complicity in abortion and scandal are impossible to avoid if the use of 
tissue from induced aborted fetuses is anything more than an isolated event. 
and if the medical use offetal tissue becomes standard practice with most of 
it coming from induced abortions, a business-as-usual relationship will be 
established between researchers and the abortion industry. 77 It is difficult to 
imagine that some type of commercial transaction in fetal tissue will not 
result from such a relationship. 
In summary, the Instruction permits fetal tissue transplantation if the 
tissue is acquired from the remains of spontaneous abortions and ectopic 
pregnancies under the conditions mentioned above. The quantity and 
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quality of tissue obtained in this way, however, limits the availability of such 
tissue for research and therapy. However, this limit may be overcome in the 
future through fetal cell cultures derived from such tissue. The possibility of 
growing fetal cells in culture is still in its early stages of research. If such 
culturing becomes possible it would remove the demand of acquiring fetal 
tissue from induced abortions and hence remove a major objection to fetal 
tissue transplantation research and therapy. 
In conclusion, fetal tissue transplantation is ethical if the source of the 
tissue is from a spontaneous abortion, an ectopic pregnancy, or fetal cell 
culture; and the conditions found in the Instruction for the use of the 
remains of human embryos and fetuses are fulfilled . 
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